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Abstract
How does membership in transnational multistakeholder institutions shape states’ domestic governance? We complement tra-
ditional compliance-based approaches by developing a process model, focusing on the independent effects of processes associ-
ated with institutional membership, but separate from commitments and compliance themselves. These effects can be driven
by iterative and participatory institutional features, which are increasingly prevalent in global governance. We apply this
model to the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a transnational multistakeholder initiative with nearly 80 member coun-
tries, featuring highly flexible commitments and weak enforcement. Although commitments and compliance have generally
been limited, a compliance-focused approach alone cannot account for myriad other consequences globally and domestically,
driven by the iterative and participatory features associated with membership. We demonstrate these at work in a case study
of Mexico’s OGP membership, which contributed to the spread of new norms and policy models, new political resources and
opportunities for reformers, and new linkages and coalitions.
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1. Introduction
How does membership in transnational institutions shape states’ domestic governance? Traditional approaches
to this question focus on compliance: The extent to which governments fulfill their commitments, and that
those commitments matter for intended outcomes. We seek to complement this approach with a process model,
whereby the processes associated with membership may have their own independent effects, separate from
(and even in the absence of) compliance with, or meaningful effects of, commitments themselves. These
process-driven effects can alter the ideas, resources, opportunities, and connections of key actors. Not all
membership-based institutions will set in motion such process-driven effects, but we suggest that they are more
likely where procedures are more iterative and more participatory – involving a larger scope of both actions
and actors.
This approach is particularly important given the increasing prevalence and salience of flexible, iterative, and
participatory elements in global governance, such as in transnational multistakeholder initiatives and other insti-
tutions embodying characteristics of soft law, “new multilateralism,” and experimentalist governance. Such
institutions generally seek to fill gaps in global governance by emphasizing both greater flexibility of rules and
enforcement, and greater non-state actor participation, than traditional international institutions
(Bäckstrand 2006; Abbott & Snidal 2013; Andonova 2014; Brockmeyer & Fox 2015; Reinsberg &
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Westerwinter 2019). Yet such iterative and participatory processes can have surprising effects of their own, that
is, empowering some participants over others, creating new political opportunities, spurring demand for new pol-
icy ideas, and linking actors together in new ways.
In this paper, we develop this process model and demonstrate its plausibility, using qualitative evidence from
one specific transnational multistakeholder initiative (henceforth, MSI): the Open Government Partnership
(OGP). We offer evidence, both globally and from an in-depth case study of Mexico, that OGP membership has
generally resulted in limited direct policy outputs and outcomes as understood by a compliance-focused
approach, yet at the same time has also been associated with broader developments highly consistent with a pro-
cess model.
The OGP was launched in 2011 by eight founding governments – Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the
Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States – and within several years had grown to
over 75 member countries. The OGP encouraged government reforms in areas of transparency, accountability,
participation, and technology in governance, and its multistakeholder institutional architecture was notable for its
flexibility, participation, and iteration. The OGP eschewed “one-size-fits-all” standards, instead encouraging gov-
ernments to make flexible, voluntary commitments that fit local context – but raising concerns over window
dressing. It embraced multistakeholder participation, giving civil society organizations full parity of representation
on its steering committee, and promoting innovative models of “co-creation” between governments and their citi-
zens. Members – subject to eligibility criteria – endorsed a declaration of shared principles and made National
Action Plans comprising specific policy commitments, designed in consultation with civil society organizations,
on a repeating cycle demanding new commitments every two years.
This structure offered many reasons for skepticism. The flexible nature of commitments, decentralized moni-
toring, and absence of any sanctions for non-implementation all suggested that membership was ripe for oppor-
tunism and window-dressing. And indeed, commitments under the OGP have often been narrow, superficial,
would have been undertaken anyway, or were poorly implemented. However, we suggest that an approach focus-
ing on commitments and compliance alone would miss a set of broader developments driven by the iterative and
participatory institutional features of the OGP. We find evidence of three process-driven pathways of change:
(i) spreading norms and policy models; (ii) empowering actors inside and outside of government; and
(iii) creating linkages and coalitions.
This article first reviews relevant literatures and clarifies the distinctions between compliance-based and
process-based models of institutional effects. We then introduce the structure and key details of the OGP as our
primary case of focus and review global-level evidence. Finally, we offer an in-depth case study of Mexico’s mem-
bership in the OGP, offering evidence of reform processes that is consistent with process-based mechanisms but
inconsistent with compliance-based mechanisms.
The Mexican case exemplifies the paradoxical character of transnational governance reform in an era of dem-
ocratic setbacks. After initially being seen as a global champion of open government reform, formal OGP collabo-
ration subsequently halted in Mexico after mounting corruption scandals and illegal surveillance of civil society
groups. On the surface, this appeared to be a case of failure. Yet broader changes had taken place, which contin-
ued to shape governance reform dynamics, including new models of reform, new sources of influence for civil
society, and new domestic and transnational linkages. These developments not only contributed to major legisla-
tive advances outside of the OGP process, but also helped establish cross-partisan appeal of open government,
laying the groundwork for the OGP process to be re-started in 2019 following a new president taking office.
While these developments do not necessarily reflect a measurable quantitative change in policy outcomes, they
do reflect shifts in the ideas, interactions, and opportunities of key actors involved in domestic governance
reform.
Although our evidence here focuses on just one institution, it is a particularly important case for several rea-
sons. The OGP is representative of global governance trends often referred to as “the new multilateralism”
(Patrick 2015) – emphasizing both flexibility and the participation of non-state actors (Tallberg et al. 2013), and
often with no link to the UN system or international law. However, the OGP also exhibits unusual degrees of
iterative and participatory institutional features, alongside demonstrably limited compliance, thereby offering a
useful test case to assess the utility of a process model.
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2. Compliance and process as transnational sources of domestic reform
Scholars have long been concerned with why states do (or do not) join international institutions, and why they
comply (or not) with their commitments to them. Realist critiques expect international institutions to accomplish
nothing beyond what would have happened otherwise, or what serves powerful state interests (e.g., Mearsheimer
1994). Many rationalist approaches understand governments’ participation in international institutions as self-
interested and shaped primarily by hard mechanisms of monitoring and credible enforcement (e.g., Keohane &
Martin 1995; Simmons & Danner 2010). Studies of compliance with international institutions often conclude that
membership has no true impact given processes of self-selection and screening (Downs et al. 1996; von
Stein 2005). And empirical studies of the impact of international institutions on measurable outcomes often con-
clude that the impact of membership is zero or even negative, as states instrumentally take advantage of “window
dressing” institutions (e.g., Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2005).
Yet other theoretical perspectives, however, see greater potential for “soft” institutions, particularly in con-
junction with processes of learning, normative change, or mobilization of non-governmental actors
(e.g., Finnemore 1993; Abbott & Snidal 2000; Newman & Posner 2016). Constructivist approaches focus on nor-
mative changes through socialization (e.g., Checkel 2001, Goodman and Jinks 2013) or learning (Ruggie 2002).
Some liberal approaches focus on pressure from below by civil society (Simmons 2009) and domestic constituen-
cies (Dai 2005), as well as transgovernmental interactions among bureaucrats themselves (Slaughter 2009). Mana-
gerial approaches (Chayes and Chayes 1993) suggest that most countries follow most of the rules, most of the
time, and view compliance shortfalls as arising from lack of capacity, coordination, or knowledge. Importantly,
however, while these theoretical approaches see a broader array of relevant social mechanisms, they often still
focus on these mechanisms as alternative explanations of compliance with either formal or informal commit-
ments or standards. Our focus in this paper is not on the debate between rationalist and constructivist social
mechanisms as routes to compliance; but rather on alternatives to compliance altogether as pathways to institu-
tional effects.
Scholars apply a similar range of approaches to studying transnational MSIs, including those with either firms
or states as key members. States or firms that join MSIs, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) (Aaronson 2011), the United Nations Global Compact (Berliner & Prakash 2015), or the Kimberley Pro-
cess (Haufler 2009), make commitments to either general principles or specific policy changes (Eberlein
et al. 2014; Rasche et al. 2020). Across differences in rationalist or constructivist theoretical orientation, most
scholars share an understanding that for such initiatives to have an impact on member behavior, members must
commit to policies that go beyond what they would have done anyway, must actually follow through in
implementing their commitments, and finally those commitments must actually matter for measurable outcomes
(e.g., Fransen & Kolk 2007; Locke et al. 2009; Berliner & Prakash 2015; Distelhorst et al. 2015).
For example, in the case of the UN Global Compact, scholars debate whether firm membership can drive pro-
gress toward its 10 principles through mechanisms of peer learning (Ruggie 2002), or whether the absence of
meaningful monitoring and enforcement will lead to minimal compliance (Sethi & Schepers 2014). Berliner and
Prakash (2015) find that while UN Global Compact members undertake more superficial corporate social respon-
sibility efforts, they actually fare worse than non-members in terms of more costly, meaningful actions. Impor-
tantly, however, our paper also goes beyond previous firm-centric studies of MSIs to focus on a setting where
governments are key members. In a similar context, studies of the EITI debate the extent of state compliance and
the effects that this has on meaningful outcomes (e.g., Öge 2016; Sovacool et al. 2016).
Thus a common thread in past research on the domestic effects of transnational institutions – including both
formal and informal international institutions and transnational MSIs – has been a shared view that compliance
with formal or informal commitments or standards constitutes the primary lens through which to assess effects
of institutional membership. This view is often shared across both rationalist and constructivist theoretical orien-
tations. We build on this past research, but suggest an alternative lens focused instead on how the processes asso-
ciated with membership can also drive change in more indirect ways.
We argue that the relevant potential impacts of institutional membership on domestic reform go beyond
states’ compliance with their commitments (whatever the theoretical mechanisms driving that compliance).
Instead, we emphasize broader mechanisms driven by the processes of membership obligations, rather than their
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content or their enforcement. Such processes can include participatory and multistakeholder settings that involve
civil society and other non-state actors in making decisions, designing actions, managing implementation, and
assessing performance; often themselves embedded in iterative cycles. We argue that process-driven mechanisms
are not simply by-products of compliance, or merely routes to compliance, but rather can have independent
effects of their own and can operate even in the absence of compliance. However, these mechanisms are often
challenging to empirically verify, as they may be difficult to measure, causally complex, emergent over longer time
frames, or highly visible only in certain cases. Yet process-driven mechanisms can produce changes in the ideas,
interactions, and opportunities of key actors at both domestic and global levels. Given the severe limits of global
governance in shaping domestic public sector reform, these changes may be just as consequential – if not more –
than those produced by compliance alone.
We highlight three such process-driven mechanisms in particular: Changing norms and policy models; creat-
ing resources and opportunities for reformers (both inside and outside of government); and forging new linkages
and coalitions (both within and across countries). Importantly, while similar mechanisms have been highlighted
in a wide array of past research including on global business regulation (e.g., Braithwaite and Drahos 2000),
experimentalist governance (e.g., De Búrca et al. 2014), soft law institutions (e.g., Abbott & Snidal 2000), and
transgovernmental networks (e.g. Newman & Posner 2016), our contribution is in conceptualizing and demon-
strating how they can be driven by processes of institutional membership and interaction, independently of com-
pliance with formal or informal commitments or standards.
First, membership processes can lead to changing norms and policy models. Although scholars across multi-
ple research traditions have developed similar ideas (e.g., Finnemore 1993, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000,
Greenhill 2015, Zimmermann 2017), we focus on novel ways in which these can be driven by iterative and partic-
ipatory institutional design features, rather than being routes to, or by-products of, compliance itself. The formal-
ized iteration of reform procedures also creates both repeated “demand” for new ideas and models, and new
opportunities for policy learning, while formalized participation of non-state actors facilitates the “supply” of
both new innovations and the transmission of norms and models from other settings. These norms and models
in turn can become embedded domestically beyond, and even without, direct commitment or compliance.
Second, membership processes can create resources and political opportunities for reformers both inside and
outside government, creating spillovers that shape reform politics even beyond the formal boundaries of commit-
ment and compliance. Formalized participation creates new decisionmaking venues and access points
(Newman & Posner 2016; Farrell & Newman 2018), whether at global or domestic levels, in which reformers can
take part or seek to influence. It also creates new sources of power. Individual participants inside of government,
often mid-level officials or specialized agencies, can gain new prestige, symbolic power, and ability to shape
agendas. Non-state participants can gain not only formal power, but also structural power (from the potential
threat of exit) and forms of network power (e.g., Avant & Westerwinter 2016; Hall et al. 2020). Finally, iteration
means that these venues and dynamics are not just one-off but are repeated, institutionalized, and come to be
expected.
Third, membership processes can enable the formation of new linkages and coalitions both within and across
countries. Formalized participation brings together actors who had not worked together previously, and where
institutions are multistakeholder and transnational this often leads to new connections across sectors, settings,
and organizational types. Iteration, in turn, reinforces these connections. Such new linkages can feed into the pre-
vious mechanisms, as well as making possible new modes of interaction and transgovernmental
(e.g., Slaughter 2009; Newman & Posner 2016) alliances. Creating domestic trans-ideological coalitions can also
enhance the durability of reform agendas across political transitions. And as Avant (2016) notes, not only the
quantity but also the quality of transnational network ties can also matter for governance.
Although these mechanisms themselves have roots in existing work, our contributions are in distinguishing
them from a focus on compliance and linking them with alternative institutional features. Crucially, we suggest
that these mechanisms can be driven by the processes of institutional membership, and particularly those that are
iterative and participatory.
Iterative and participatory institutional design features are more prevalent in some types of institutions than
others. Transnational multistakeholder initiatives (Raymond & DeNardis 2015), for example, such as the Kimber-
ley Process and EITI, are more frequently participatory and iterative than more traditional organizations. Yet
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these features are present to differing degrees across institutions, as seen in systematic studies of NGO access
(Tallberg et al. 2013), and multistakeholder participation in examples such as Agenda 21 (Rosenberg &
Thomas 2005) and the Sustainable Development Goals (Senit 2020). Recent work on global experimentalist gov-
ernance (De Búrca et al. 2014), the UN’s Universal Periodic Review (Milewicz & Goodin 2018; Carraro 2019),
and the Paris Climate Agreement “pledge-and-review” system (Hale 2016) also point toward the wider prevalence
and increasing importance of iterative features incorporating a framework for organized, repeated action and
review. While comparative study is beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest that such multistakeholder partici-
pation and formalized iteration are among the most likely institutional design features to enable process-driven
mechanism of change. In order to demonstrate the utility of a process-based model, we focus here on one partic-
ularly relevant institution in which these features are highly salient.
3. The case of the Open Government Partnership
To illustrate and offer initial evidence for these arguments, this paper focuses on the case of the OGP, a multi-
stakeholder initiative with 78 member countries as of 2020. As we demonstrate in this section, the OGP appears
as an unlikely case to drive meaningful changes in public sector reform according to a compliance-based view,
given its relatively weak institutional design and poor track record of commitments and their implementation.
However, it also features high levels of iteration and participation, making it a useful case to study in order to
highlight more unexpected, process-driven mechanisms of change. We first introduce the key features of the
OGP, and then discuss the relevance of both models of impact. Finally, we offer evidence from a case study of
the OGP in Mexico, highlighting a broader set of changes in domestic governance, despite largely disappointing
compliance and the collapse of formal multistakeholder collaboration.
3.1. Origins and institutional structure of the OGP
The OGP first took shape through conversations in early 2011 between several interested governments, civil soci-
ety groups, and donors. Their goals were to create a new kind of initiative that embraced flexibility and participa-
tion, and avoided traditional models of international organization focused on binding treaties, one-size-fits-all
standards, and international bureaucracies (Weinstein 2013). As of its launch in September 2011, 46 governments
had already announced their intention to join, and by 2019 it had 78 member countries.1 To join, countries must
meet four eligibility criteria (requiring minimum levels of civil liberties, access to information legislation, fiscal
transparency, and public asset disclosure), endorse a declaration of open government, and commit to delivering
action plans co-created with civil society and to being assessed on their progress.2
The National Action Plan (NAP) cycle is the core process requirement of OGP membership. Governments
produce a new NAP, in consultation with domestic civil society partners, every two years. These plans have
included between 4 and 75 commitments, which vary widely in scope, ambition, and issue focus.3 This variation
highlights the OGP’s emphasis on flexibility. Its founders explicitly wanted to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” standard,
or the impression of top-down pressure by the global north (Weinstein 2013), instead emphasizing the ability of
governments to pursue their own varying domestic goals. However, this flexibility led to frequent concerns that
governments would take advantage by opportunistically pursuing primarily technical, rather than political,
reforms – or even “window dressing” altogether – while nonetheless burnishing their reputations on the world
stage.4
But the OGP’s legitimacy depended on the buy-in from civil society groups and advocacy coalitions, necessi-
tating that this flexibility be balanced with two institutional features: iteration and participation.
The NAP cycle was iterative, to be repeated every two years. Member governments could not simply repeat
the same commitments, rather they had to continuously generate novel reform projects. Further, the NAPs were
subject to external monitoring by the OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM), which contracted local
researchers to assess each plan, producing a report on the quality of consultative process, the ambition, specificity,
and relevance of individual commitments, and their actual implementation.5
The OGP’s governance structure was unprecedented in its degree of participation for civil society. Its leader-
ship positions rotate, with two co-chairs – one a government and one an individual civil society member. The
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Steering Committee itself is made up of an equal number of governments and civil society members.6 This is a
notably greater formal role for civil society than in existing tripartite institutions such as the International Labour
Organization and the EITI. Holding fully half of the seats on the OGP’s Steering Committee means that a united
civil society caucus needs only one supportive government member in order to obtain a majority. Importantly,
civil society coalitions have used this newfound role to successfully push for several changes in the institutional
design of the OGP, including a “response policy” enabling the OGP to respond to member governments
restricting associational rights.7 This focus on participation obtains at national levels as well and in many cases
has deepened over time (Brockmeyer and Fox, p. 39). The OGP also began promoting increasingly precise and
prescriptive standards8 for consultative processes and institutionalized multistakeholder bodies to be adhered to
in the domestic development and implementation of NAPs.
There are few direct sanctions, however, related to the content of NAPs. Only if member governments fail to
produce NAPs altogether for several years is a process of review by the Steering Committee initiated that might,
ultimately, render them inactive. Only in 2017 did the OGP begin a series of reforms increasing the stringency of
standards that might bring a member under Steering Committee review – yet these focused primarily on the con-
sultative process of NAP design rather than on commitments themselves. Thus, as long as a member government
conducts a semblance of a consultative process to produce a NAP every two years, it can remain in good standing
even if the commitments themselves are superficial, irrelevant, or never implemented.
3.2. Evaluating OGP action plans and commitments
We briefly review global-level evidence of different models of impact as relevant to states’ membership in the
OGP. A compliance model suggests a focus on NAPs, the commitments that governments make, and the extent
to which they complied with those commitments.
In Table 1, we examine data produced by the IRM review process itself on policy input and output dimen-
sions. These encompass 781 individual commitments from plans adopted in 2012, 2013, and 2014 (for which the
IRM had assessed the “end-of-term” completion as of 2018) across 45 different member countries. For simplicity,
we categorize here as “High Ambition” those commitments that the IRM researcher coded as either “moderate”
or “potentially transformative,” and we categorize as “High Completion” those that were assessed as either “com-
plete” or “substantially complete.”
Just over half (0.542) of all commitments were coded as “moderate” or “transformative” potential impact. Just
over two-thirds (0.676) of all commitments were coded as substantially or fully complete. And yet, many ambi-
tious commitments were not completed, and many completed commitments were relatively superficial, such that
only just over one-third (0.365) of all commitments were both ambitious and implemented. Given that govern-
ments choose their own commitments, thus enabling them to “select in” to commitments that are least costly, or
already planned or in progress, this is a low figure indeed. The OGP has identified common barriers to imple-
mentation including lack of resources, capacity, coordination, and political support (Falla 2017).
Some commitments even appear irrelevant or superficial, such as Malta’s commitment to “cleaner beaches”
and Costa Rica’s to “conduct a feasibility study on the modernization of the postal service.” Many also involve
only narrow applications of information technology, such as launching government social media accounts, mobile
technology devices in schools, or digitizing public service delivery without clear connection to transparency,
Table 1 Summary of Open Government Partnership commitments, design, and implementation assessed by the
Independent Reporting Mechanism
Low completion High completion Totals
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accountability, or public participation. The IRM’s data showed that “e-government” was the single most common
theme of commitments, leading to critiques of the OGP for “open-washing.”9
How to evaluate the impacts of national membership in the OGP? According to a compliance-based view, this
limited extent of ambition and implementation of OGP commitments suggests a clear expectation for little in the
way of meaningful changes in public sector reform. Yet we suggest a broader perspective beyond commitments
and compliance alone. Process-driven mechanisms of change can shape public sector reform even in the absence
of meaningful commitments or outcomes of formal compliance. Instead of commitment and compliance directly,
these mechanisms are driven by the processes associated with membership, commitment-making, and
compliance-assessing; particularly iterative and participatory institutional features.
The OGP’s iterative and participatory NAP cycle exemplifies recent ideas on “experimentalism” in global gov-
ernance (De Búrca et al. 2014). Through learning, review, and experimentation, this iterative process aims to pro-
vide feedback that ultimately strengthens the compliance mechanisms themselves, yielding commitments that are
more ambitious, more relevant, and more likely to be implemented.
However, these processes have also had important effects of their own, distinct from the potential implemen-
tation of commitments they produce. Although the OGP offers government’s substantial room for opportunism
in the content of NAPs, it still requires their repeated production. Thus even a government intent on pure “win-
dow dressing” membership must still hold a consultative process and produce something in a NAP – and then
repeat the whole process again two years later – even if none of the commitments in that plan are meaningful or
implemented. This means member countries effectively must “keep running just to stand still.” Each new round
of consultation and commitment-making has the potential to create new political opportunities for reformers, and
to offer civil society groups a “seat at the table,” a focal point for advocacy, and tools of potential leverage includ-
ing even the threat of exit. It can also spur the demand for new policy models, given that commitments are at least
expected to be new initiatives, thus creating repeated openings for both domestic and transnational norm entre-
preneurs. Finally, these iterative and participatory processes also bring many different types of actors together,
creating new linkages both within countries and transnationally.
Examples of these can be seen in cases around the world. Norms of open government have been increas-
ingly mainstreamed in national and subnational governments, as well as in international institutions like the
World Bank and OECD (Ingrams et al. 2020). OGP processes have served as a platform to facilitate the
emergence and diffusion of new global standards, like the Open Data Charter, the Open Contracting Data
Standard, and the Beneficial Ownership Standard.10 Domestic reformers have gained new political opportu-
nities and sources of leverage, as coalitions in many OGP member countries have successfully used their
new role to shape domestic policy agendas, obtain long-demanded policy concessions such as the adoption
of new access-to-information laws,11 or to block adverse developments such as South Africa’s Secrecy Bill.12
Finally, OGP processes also created new linkages, such as bringing together distinct and sometimes mutually
suspicious issue coalitions like access-to-information and open data advocates (McIntosh 2012), and
attracting cross-ideological domestic coalitions that helped maintain political support for open government
reforms even across major partisan transitions in member countries like Argentina, France, and the Philip-
pines. Our focus in the remainder of this paper is to illustrate these mechanisms at work with evidence
from a detailed case study of Mexico.
4. Evidence from Mexico
To demonstrate the plausibility of our argument, we evaluate the applicability of both compliance and process
models in the case of Mexico’s OGP membership. We follow Mexico’s history of engagement with the OGP from
its founding in 2011 until 2019, through three rounds of NAPs and multiple changes in executive power. We find
substantial evidence of process-driven mechanisms at work, even as Mexico’s actual OGP commitments were
often limited and viewed with skepticism. And despite the collapse of executive-level collaboration after a surveil-
lance scandal, we find evidence of broad institutionalization as open government efforts continued among civil
society, in the bureaucracy, in the legislature, and subnationally. These would be surprising given a narrow
approach focusing only on compliance, yet can be far better accounted for with a process model incorporating
such broader impacts.
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4.1. Methodology and case selection
This case study was carried out through extensive review of official OGP documents, third-party reports, Mexican
news media, and interviews conducted between 2017 and 2019 either in Mexico City or remotely with representa-
tives of five different civil society groups in Mexico, four current or former government officials, and three repre-
sentatives of the OGP globally. Interviewees were assured they would only be identified by type of organization
(government, CSO, OGP) in order to ensure their ability to speak frankly.
Our goal is to use details of within-case processes to test between two rival interpretations how Mexico’s
OGP membership shaped domestic governance reform: a compliance model and a process model. These can be
expressed as two competing hypotheses:
H1. : To the extent that OGP membership had impacts on governance reform in Mexico, this impact was
driven by formal commitments and their implementation.
H2. : To the extent that OGP membership had impacts on governance reform in Mexico, this impact was
driven by iterative and participatory processes.
Of course, much depends on how one defines “impacts” in this setting, particularly when reform efforts over
short- or medium-term timeframes are so rarely ever found to have measurable impacts on governance outcomes
(Fox 2015). Here we emphasize not only “quantitative” shifts in public sector governance but also “qualitative”
developments in the strategies and tactics by which governmental and non-governmental actors seek to shape
it. These may include changes in the nature of interactions among different sets of actors, the processes of
decisionmaking, or the types of policies being pursued.
Our case selection of Mexico is motivated by its status as a highly likely case for a compliance model to oper-
ate, relative to other OGP members. Mexico was among the founding countries of the OGP and so had played a
role in designing the system of rules around NAPs and commitments. It was a new democracy, often highlighted
as a key factor shaping compliance (Grewal & Voeten 2015). It had a reform reputation to uphold given its
widely hailed and broadly used 2002 access to information law (Berliner & Erlich 2015; Berliner et al. 2018). And
it featured an active civil society in areas of transparency, corruption, and human rights. All these factors suggest
a “high water mark” for compliance mechanisms to be operating, relative to other OGP members. Yet instead we
still see limited compliance, making Mexico an important case to assess for evidence of alternative mechanisms at
work instead. Mexico is also broadly representative of many other middle-income democracies or hybrid regimes
that engage substantially with international and transnational institutions, but with frequent concerns over that
engagement’s lack of impact.
We first summarize the chronology of Mexico’s membership in the OGP. We then assess evidence as to the
potential impact of OGP commitments and their compliance. Finally, we explore the potential of process-driven
mechanisms by analyzing a series of specific developments beyond formal commitments.
4.2. Summary of Mexico’s OGP membership
Mexico was one of the OGP’s founding members, having been involved in the initial discussions in January 2011
in Washington, DC, that led to its creation (Weinstein 2013). Mexico was seen as a global leader in transparency
reforms, particularly for its 2002 access to information law and active information commission. Representatives
of the governing Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) party, the independent information commission, and domestic
civil society groups were all involved early on in shaping Mexico’s OGP membership.
As one of the eight founding countries, Mexican government had committed to present an action plan at the
formal launch of the OGP in September 2011. But as with most of the founding members, this process was
widely acknowledged as rushed and generally yielding commitments that were superficial or already underway.13
Civil society groups criticized the rushed timeframe, limited commitments, and incorporation of only one civil
society proposal.14 They even “threatened to leave and denounce the partnership,”15 highlighting the potential
threat of exit that could undermine the legitimacy of such participatory processes. In response to this criticism,
Mexico’s government revised its first NAP to include “a wider set of commitments, each with a unique co-
governance structure between civil society and government.”16
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During this revision process, the federal government, civil society groups, and the independent information
commission jointly formed a “Tripartite Technical Secretariat” (STT) to “act as a permanent and institutionalized
space for decisionmaking, consultation, monitoring compliance with the commitments” – with each “sector” hav-
ing one vote.17 The eight18 civil society members of this body formed a coalition known as the Núcleo de la
Sociedad Civil, or civil society core group. We return to the STT in a later section to emphasize key roles it
played in process-driven mechanisms.
On July 1, 2012, Mexican voters elected Enrique Peña Nieto to the Presidency, returning to power the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) that had governed for decades until 2000. The new administration could well
have been hostile toward the OGP, as an initiative of its predecessor, and chosen to abandon or neglect
it. Instead, the new administration found reasons to embrace the OGP, both linking it with its own reformist
agenda and as a way of signaling commitment to reform.19 Mexico was selected as the lead government chair of
the OGP steering committee, a role it would hold for one year beginning October 2014 and that would involve
hosting the OGP’s Global Summit in October 2015.
Yet Mexico’s year as OGP chair also saw mounting human rights concerns over the disappearance of 43 stu-
dents in Ayotzinapa, corruption scandals, and rapidly deteriorating approval ratings of the President. In this con-
text, many participants suggested that the government “lost interest” in the OGP aside from its open data
agenda.20 One official even noted that after the 2015 summit, “the boom of open government diminished a
bit.”21 Although the third NAP was praised for its ambition and inclusive design process,22 ministries began
attempting to restrict the scope of their commitments.23 With the Peña Nieto administration increasingly unpop-
ular and burdened with scandals, some civil society groups became concerned that they were being used to bur-
nish the government’s international image and worried about their organizations’ reputations.24
In this setting, a scandal over illegal digital surveillance led to the ultimate collapse of the national-level col-
laborative process, proving to be in the words of one participant, “the final drop of water.”25 Beginning in
February 2017, investigations published evidence of the Mexican government’s use of Pegasus spyware software
to monitor journalists, politicians, and activists – including from the OGP coalition.26 The civil society coalition
debated how to respond, but eventually concluded the necessity of withdrawing from the STT. One said “if we
continue, and let them get away with undermining the process, we will be part of a huge simulation.”27 The with-
drawal was front-page news in Mexico.28 Over the next year, the civil society groups refused to re-engage until a
more credible investigation was undertaken of the illegal digital surveillance; and the government’s efforts on its
remaining commitments stagnated.
Yet this collapse proved not to be final. In July 2018, voters chose a new left-wing president, Andrés Manuel
Lopez Obrador. Many civil society coalition members were initially skeptical that the new administration would
seek renewed collaboration, given Obrador’s often-negative comments about civil society groups as unre-
presentative.29 However, on March 5, 2019, Mexico announced the resumption of collaboration between the civil
society core group, the information commission INAI, and the Ministry of Public Administration, both to begin
work on a fourth NAP and to address the surveillance issue beginning with agreement “on a roadmap to avoid
cases like Pegasus from ever happening.”30
4.3. Evaluating the compliance model
To what extent did Mexico’s first three rounds of NAPs make formal contributions to effective governance
reform? In Table 2, we assess these, suggesting that the OGP’s formal compliance-based process yielded commit-
ments largely limited in their substance or implementation.
In global perspective, Mexico’s NAP performance appears mixed. Its consultative procedures actually became
a model for many other countries, and it implemented (substantially or in full) the majority of its commitments,
particularly in the second NAP. But many of these commitments were not particularly ambitious, and many were
not implemented. In its second NAP, 20 of 26 commitments were assessed by the IRM reviewer as having only
“minor” potential impact. In its third NAP, a stronger eight of 11 were scored as having “moderate” potential
impact. However, no commitment in either plan was evaluated as having “transformative” potential impact, com-
pared with 17% of all OGP commitments globally.31 And in the third NAP, under half of all commitments were
completed.
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Many commitments were clearly narrow in scope, such as publishing datasets pertaining to higher education,
or “a national catalog of social programs.” Others offered relatively vague frameworks for stakeholder consulta-
tion toward opening particular types of data, but lacking in definitive deliverables. Others were flouted, such as a
commitment to consultations in appointment processes or a strategy to prevent conflicts of interest with industry
regarding child obesity.32 Many others, often representing disclosures or data portals in specific sectors or issue
areas, were indeed completed but then never updated again after the close of the review process.
Many participants in the OGP process spoke of disappointment with the broader impact of commitments, or
with the IRM review itself. One CSO representative said, “we didn’t do well in terms of putting forward commit-
ments that were transformative.”33 Another said that commitments were “not a good way to go. They are valu-
able, but often are not updated afterwards… they have not changed the culture in institutions.”34 And another
said “The IRM was useless… always six months or a year too late for learning or accountability… nobody men-
tions it.”35
4.4. Evaluating the process model
Mexico might superficially seem to be a disappointing case for the OGP. Despite a consultative process that was
widely emulated globally, the resulting commitments had yielded limited results. Further, civil society’s with-
drawal seemed to demonstrate the ultimate failure of collaboration.
However, this perspective would neglect many broader changes that had taken place, stemming from
Mexico’s OGP membership and its processes, but not following directly a pathway running from policy inputs to
policy outputs to policy outcome. To demonstrate these, we trace four different sets of empirical developments
that reveal these process-driven mechanisms at work in Mexico: among civil society, inside government, in new
legislation, and subnationally.
4.5. Changes in civil society
The STT – the tripartite body comprising representatives of the federal government, the information commission,
and civil society – was responsible for developing commitments and coordinating their implementation. How-
ever, it also had broader effects in creating new political resources and opportunities for civil society and shaping
patterns of behavior among civil society groups themselves.
First, having a “seat at the table” empowered civil society in multiple ways. Even beyond direct contributions
to the selection and design of NAP commitments, they could also forge new links with bureaucrats in relevant
ministries who shared their goals or interests and bring pressure to bear on more resistant bureaucrats, given
top-level political commitment to the process.36 Membership also gave civil society groups new forms of struc-
tural power, from their implicit threat of exit that could (and ultimately did) delegitimize the government’s OGP
membership. One civil society participant said:
“Having and being involved in the process and being recognized by the government as a legitimate partner, it
creates liabilities for the government if they decide to behave badly… [Civil society can] leave, and then they’re
going to suffer from their legitimacy nationally and globally. That’s a credible threat for the governments.”37













1 2011–2013 Not rated 36 Not rated 0.694 (midterm only)
2 2013–2015 5/6 26 0.231 0.923 (0.731 at midterm)
3 2016–2018 4/6 11 0.727 0.455 (0 at midterm)
For each plan, we give the score assessing the strength of the consultative design process according to the Independent
Reporting Mechanism (IRM) researcher (except for the first plan that was assessed before the IRM began collecting this infor-
mation), the total number of commitments, the proportion of these commitments assessed as having either “moderate” or
“transformative” potential impact, and the proportion assessed as either “complete” or “substantially complete.”
© 2021 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.10
D. Berliner et al. Process effects of MSIs
Participants themselves saw these forms of influence as one of the OGP’s most important features. One noted “hav-
ing a policy-building space with government at a high level – this was a change from before.”38 Another com-
mented that the OGP was “like steroids for civil society,” noting it enabled them to “pressure government from the
inside and the outside.”39 A government official agreed, saying that “the first steps that we made with OGP gave a
lot of power to civil society, and they gained a lot of legitimacy to put some pressure on the authorities.”40
Second, in addition to providing new opportunities for civil society, the STT also brought changes among civil
society coalitions themselves. Many of the organizations had not traditionally worked in concert on shared goals
that crossed the boundaries of individual issue areas or ideological leanings. The eight members of the core group
participating in the STT included human rights, anticorruption, environmental, technology, and business organi-
zations. Some of these normally engaged in research and non-partisan activities, while others assumed a more
confrontational stance. Some were solely domestic organizations, and others were local chapters of global net-
works. In the context of often-bitter ideological divides among Mexican civil society, this diversity was striking.41
No prior transparency coalitions had been this broad.42 In some cases, these organizations were also previously
reticent to work directly with the government, preferring more confrontational modes of engagement.
Several participants thus credited the OGP with introducing a new culture of collaboration, both among civil
society groups, and between those groups and the government.43 One civil society participant said that they “used
to be in silos” but “now are working together more, across human rights, transparency, digital.”44 Another said
that “civil society organizations in Mexico had been very separated, individualistic” and noted that while
transparency-specific organizations had been working together for many years, “the OGP helped create the envi-
ronment to get together with other organizations” from beyond a narrow transparency agenda.45
A government official shared a similar perspective:
“Something that was not very present before, is that civil society got conscious that they have to build partner-
ships and collaboration within themselves… They have become conscious that if they are partners, they can
demand more from the authorities.”46
4.6. Empowerment of reformers inside government
The OGP also empowered reformers inside government, through increased access to attention, resources, and
international venues, as well as collaboration from civil society groups. One participant described this process in
general, noting that:
“During the Calderon administration, there were a couple of civil servants kind of enjoying the show, like ‘we
want to push this agenda.’ Inside the government, people didn’t want this agenda to be heard and to be dis-
cussed. But they became quite competitive with civil society, pushing from inside and outside.”47
The information commission’s coordinating role in the OGP process also raised its profile both nationally and
internationally, and it used the imprimatur of this role to publicize and promote open government issues in gen-
eral, even when working beyond formal action plans and commitments. In the Finance Ministry, the Perfor-
mance Evaluation Unit (Unidad de Evaluacion del Desempeño) also relied on the OGP process and the new
avenues of communication with outside groups that it established, contributing to the success and continuity of
its online budget portal (Salamanca & Takahashi 2015).
The Digital Strategy National Coordinating office (CEDN) in the Office of the President, created under Peña
Nieto to lead the government’s open data efforts, made similar use of OGP processes and venues to help ensure
space on the policy agenda and the opportunity to gain high-level commitments to support their efforts. One for-
mer official described this process:
“For us, we wanted to promote this agenda. We wanted to promote open government nationally… It was a
moment to interact with the government in a very strong way with a very open channel to have influence in
a lot of the decision-making process.”48
For example, CEDN officials focused on emphasizing key goals in the draft of Peña Nieto’s speech at the 2015
OGP summit, hoping that this public commitment would ensure follow-through. One official said that “they
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made the President commit to them there, in an international forum, so that there was no way back, they had to
implement them.”49 Importantly, many of these goals were not part of the NAP at the time, but rather additional
initiatives that reformers inside government hoped to promote. These included a commitment to publish con-
struction contracts according to the new Open Contracting Data Standard and the creation of a new online pub-
lic participation platform by the interior ministry SEGOB.50
4.7. Legislative developments
Legislative processes unrelated to OGP membership also demonstrate all three process-driven mechanisms at
work. Norms of legislative openness spread in the form of a “culture of collaboration” between civil society and
government; the OGP offered civil society groups new political opportunities and sources of influence; and the
new civil society coalitions forged by the STT continued to work together in other arenas. The clearest example
of these was an unprecedented form of collaboration in the legislative process that designed the 2015 Ley General
de Transparencia, strengthening Mexico’s access-to-information regime. Mexico’s OGP membership had process-
driven impacts at two stages of this process: First, in contributing to a remarkably open and collaborative legisla-
tive process, and second, in helping block a last-minute attempt by the Presidency to weaken the resulting draft.
A 2014 constitutional reform strengthened the right to information in Mexico, but required specific
implementing legislation to update the existing access to information (ATI) law, first adopted in 2002. While ini-
tial plans for drafting the new law incorporated only limited consultation with outside experts, in response to
pressure from civil society groups the Mexican Senate created a drafting group incorporating representatives of
the three major political parties along with civil society groups from three different coalitions and including sev-
eral members of the OGP civil society group (Ruelas Serna 2016, p. 10). This process continued from October to
December 2014, producing a “ground-breaking” draft that strengthened the independence of the information
commission, limited the use of exemptions, and expanded the scope of the ATI law to apply to previously
excluded entities and levels of government.51
However, in early 2015 the Presidency announced over 80 last-minute changes to the bill, seen as a serious
weakening of Mexico’s ATI regime.52 Civil society groups sought to highlight these changes in both domestic and
international media and put pressure on the government to reverse the changes. This included efforts to leverage
OGP structures and the global OGP community to apply external pressure as well. The Mexican OGP civil soci-
ety coalition wrote a formal letter to the STT requesting that the changes be withdrawn,53 and also sought a
response from the OGP globally. Although previously reticent to respond to matters beyond NAPs, in this case
the two Steering Committee civil society co-chairs wrote a statement on their own behalf, but published on the
OGP’s website and distributed through OGP channels. This statement praised the collaborative process that had
produced the earlier, stronger draft, but highlighted criticisms of the proposed changes, explicitly drawing a con-
trast with Mexico’s OGP role.54 Although not a statement of the OGP itself, domestic media covered this as an
international rebuke.55 One civil society participant noted that they had used Mexico’s OGP membership as
“leverage.”56
Ultimately, most of the reversals were dropped and the final bill excluded all but three of the last-minute
amendments, while incorporating most of the gains of the earlier collaborative process.57 On the Right to Infor-
mation Rating, produced by international legal experts, Mexico’s score rose from 120 to 136 – making it the
strongest such law in the world at that time. While this process was a success of advocates and reformers more
broadly, it highlights important leverage offered by the OGP both domestically and internationally.
Similar mechanisms can be seen in the legislative development of Mexico’s new Sistema Nacional
Anticorrupcion in 2015 and 2016, praised as “a watershed moment in Mexico.”58 Legislative drafting was done
using procedures widely referred to as “parlamento abierto” – open parliament – meaning not just collaboration
with civil society and experts59 but also the publication of all drafts and live broadcast of all debates.60 Many par-
ticipants and observers reflected on the unprecedented nature of this process.61
Together, these two legislative developments reflect an ongoing qualitative shift in expectations of legitimate
decisionmaking toward increased participation and collaboration, even beyond the formal boundaries of the OGP
process. One civil society representative called these “examples of how this way to work permeates to the way
civil society relates to government.”62 Another said:
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“Let me put it like this: It didn’t start with OGP, but OGP provided us with the framework that we really
needed, even the same words – cocreation, open parliament – all these kinds of things were picked from the
OGP discourse… We were the same organizations that were pushing in these different areas for those reforms,
at the same time as we were working in OGP. We didn’t want to bring those kinds of discussions within the
OGP sphere in Mexico; they needed to happen in a parallel dimension but using the same model. It was not an
accident, we decided to do that.”63
4.8. Subnational institutionalization
A subnational open government initiative also demonstrates the institutionalization of new norms and models,
even after the collapse of executive-level collaboration in 2017. This initiative functioned as a “mini-OGP” with
its own tripartite structure in every participating Mexican state. Yet, crucially, the initiative was unrelated to the
global OGP, which had its own distinct subnational pilot program.
The initiative was launched in 2015 by the information commission, and by 2016 had grown to encompass 23 out
of Mexico’s 32 states (including the Federal District),64 and 26 by 2018.65 Notably, these included states governed by
all three traditional major parties. This cross-ideological appeal demonstrates an example of the OGP contributing to
the building of new coalitions, drawing political allies that might have previously been more skeptical.
The core elements of the initiative were the formation of “Local Technical Secretariats” – with a tripartite
structure comprising the governor’s administration, local civil society groups, and the state-level information
commission – and the creation and implementation of action plans. Although the subnational initiative was inde-
pendent from the global OGP, its structure, process, and goals were closely and explicitly modeled after it. Early
discussions explicitly saw the initiative as “replicating the national work model.”66 And one former government
official noted that the although the subnational initiative was separate from the OGP, it was spearheaded by “peo-
ple who were involved in OGP” and “knew OGP very well,” and that the idea had “come from the Mexican
experience of the OGP.”67
Importantly, this subnational initiative continued moving forward despite the collapse of national-level collab-
oration. If anything, national-level civil society groups ultimately become even more involved, working to support
local organizations’ involvement. One participant even called it an attempt to “institutionalize open government,
so as not to depend so much on the Presidency.”68 Although this subnational collaboration may ultimately face
challenges of its own, it nonetheless demonstrates how Mexico’s participation in the global OGP process directly
led to the emergence of a new policy model shaping the goals and strategies of domestic governance reform
efforts.
4.9. Summary and alternative explanations
Mexico’s experience as a member of the OGP thus highlights the utility of a process model in shedding light on
broader mechanisms of change that might otherwise be obscured. In Mexico, the OGP played a role in spreading
new ideas and policy models and engendering a culture of collaboration that took root beyond the formal NAP
process. It offered new resources and political opportunities to reformers, both inside and outside of government.
And finally, it established new linkages and coalitions, both between different factions of civil society and across
ideological divides in ways that made it easier for reform agendas to survive political transitions. Each of these
arose not from commitment or compliance, but rather from the iterative and participatory processes associated
with OGP membership – repeated multistakeholder collaboration to produce and implement NAPs and engage
with transnational partners.
We do not argue that all of these developments – new forms of influence and collaboration among civil soci-
ety groups, new opportunities for reformers in government, specific legislative developments, and a subnational
multistakeholder reform initiative – are solely attributable to the OGP. Each was also shaped by other ongoing
domestic and transnational dimensions of the politics and ideas of good governance reform. However, our evi-
dence has highlighted key moments, actions, and outcomes that would not have happened without the new
resources, opportunities, models, and linkages created by the OGP. While some of developments reviewed above
might have occurred in a world with no OGP, the centrality of OGP structures and models evidenced suggest
that many would not; at least not in the same form and with the same results.
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Evidence from the case of Mexico is also inconsistent from several possible alternative explanations for these
same developments, emphasizing other international or domestic factors. None of these developments were com-
mitments to or requirements of either the OGP or any other international body. No other international or trans-
national entities offered Mexican civil society groups the same opportunities for participation and influence. Nor
can changes in government partisanship account for the timelines of these developments, given their continuity
from PAN to PRI governments in 2012 (despite the PRI’s authoritarian past), and the renewed OGP process
under the new left-wing government after 2018. Importantly, processes of transnational policy learning and norm
diffusion played out over this period alongside the OGP as well as within and through it, so one possibility is that
OGP processes simply “rode the wave” of developments that would have happened anyway. However, we have
demonstrated key process evidence of developments that were inseparable from the OGP as a transmission belt
(for norms of collaborative policymaking), institutional model (the subnational initiative), specific policymaking
venue (the STT), focusing event (NAP rounds and global summits), or source of external leverage (first NAP and
transparency law reforms).
Overall, the evidence from this case study is much more consistent with H2 than H1.
That is, we see evidence of broader mechanisms consistent with a process model, but inconsistent with a nar-
row view expecting only compliance-based pathways for OGP membership to drive domestic change.
5. Conclusion
Scholars have long debated the effects of institutional membership on domestic governance. Much of this debate
has focused on the question of compliance: Whether or not, why, and under what circumstances governments
follow through on their commitments. Narrow versions of this approach see impacts of membership flowing pri-
marily through a causal chain whereby governments say they will do things, subsequently do those things, and
those things in fact matter. However, this chain running from policy inputs to policy outputs to policy outcomes
often breaks down. Indeed in the case of the OGP, commitments often proved superficial, limited, or not
implemented. This suggests looking beyond debates between rationalist and constructivist theoretical approaches
to compliance, to instead consider alternative pathways to change altogether.
We suggest that scholars, especially those studying multistakeholder initiatives and other iterative and partici-
patory institutions, should consider what we call a process model of impact. This model emphasizes mechanisms
driven by the processes of membership, commitment-making, and compliance-assessing; but not necessarily by
the substance or outcomes of those commitments themselves. These broader mechanisms include changing
norms and policy models, political resources and opportunities for reformers, and new linkages and coalitions
both within and across countries. Importantly, compliance and process models are not mutually exclusive, but
can operate either together or in isolation. We suggest that process-driven mechanisms will be more prevalent
where institutional design features are more iterative and participatory.
Our focus in this paper is on demonstrating the plausibility of this process model, by examining an institution
whose design – with demonstrably limited formal compliance but a highly iterative and participatory process –
helps to distinguish between the two models at work. We offer evidence both globally and from Mexico that
OGP commitments are often limited, superficial, or not implemented; and that even gold-standard commitments
are unlikely to prove transformative on their own. Yet the processes of OGP membership can drive a separate set
of mechanisms, producing changes in the ideas, interactions, and opportunities of key actors at both domestic
and global levels.
Many of the key process-driven developments that we reviewed in Mexico also appear relevant in other OGP
member states. Civil society coalitions wielded the threat of exit from domestic collaboration in Croatia and
Guatemala.69 Subnational open government initiatives – distinct from the OGP’s own subnational pilot program
– emerged in Nigeria and Indonesia.70 And newly emerging policy models like the Open Contracting Data
Standard and Beneficial Ownership standard – using the OGP process as a “platform” to kick-start their own
development and diffusion – are increasingly being adopted by other countries. Although our case study of
Mexico is designed to demonstrate the plausibility of a process-focused approach, we thus see it as broadly repre-
sentative of the experience of many countries around the world. Although future research will be needed to
directly investigate the scope conditions for process effects to be more likely, we surmise that these may include
© 2021 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.14
D. Berliner et al. Process effects of MSIs
some combination of minimally democratic institutions and relevance of the international community, with
intermediate levels of administrative capacity that are sufficient to enable meaningful participation, but not so
great as to be entirely resistant to outside input.
Finally, although this paper focuses on just one institution in order to most clearly demonstrate the process
model’s plausibility and importance, our arguments may generalize to many others featuring iterative and partici-
patory processes, including in other policy areas. These include other multistakeholder initiatives like the EITI,
participatory efforts like Agenda 21 and the Sustainable Development Goals, iterative mechanisms like the UN’s
Universal Periodic Review and the Paris climate agreement’s pledge-and-review system, and the increasing incor-
poration of participatory elements across many international institutions. Future work should undertake a
broader comparative research agenda aimed at better understanding the scope conditions for process-driven
mechanisms to be effective, amid the increasingly diverse array of institutional design features in global
governance.
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